Realism and constructivism in social perception. by Kihlstrom, John F
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Realism and constructivism in social perception.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3p99k26j
Journal
The Behavioral and brain sciences, 40
ISSN
0140-525X
Author
Kihlstrom, John F
Publication Date
2017
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x15002344
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
effect was substantially more pronounced among those who
scored the highest on the CRT (Kahan 2013).
The tragic conﬂict of expressive rationality. As indicated, iden-
tity-protective reasoning is routinely included in the roster of cog-
nitive mechanisms that evince bounded rationality. But where an
information-processing dynamic is consistently shown to be mag-
niﬁed, not constrained, by exactly the types of reasoning proﬁcien-
cies that counteract the mental pratfalls associated with heuristic
information processing, then one should presumably update
one’s classiﬁcation of that dynamic as a “cognitive bias.”
In fact, the antagonism between identity-protective cognition
and perceptual accuracy is not a consequence of too little rational-
ity but too much. Nothing an ordinary member of the public does
as consumer, as voter, or participant in public discourse will have
any effect on the risk that climate change poses to her or anyone
else. Same for gun control, fracking, and nuclear waste disposal:
her actions just don’t matter enough to inﬂuence collective behav-
ior or policymaking. But given what positions on these issues
signify about the sort of person she is, adopting a mistaken
stance on one of these in her everyday interactions with other
ordinary people could expose her to devastating consequences,
both material and psychic. It is perfectly rational under these cir-
cumstances to process information in a manner that promotes for-
mation of the beliefs on these issues that express her group
allegiances, and to bring all her cognitive resources to bear in
doing so.
This account roots identity-protective cognition in the theory of
“expressive rationality,” a rival to both the rational actor model in
conventional economics and the bounded-rationality paradigm
(Anderson 1993). The basic tenet of this account is that individuals
derive “expressive utility,” intrinsic and instrumental, from actions
that, against the background of social norms, convey their deﬁning
group commitments (Akerlof & Kranton 2000). Actions of this
sort – like pretty much any other (Peirce 1877) – are reliably
enabled by appropriate beliefs. Identity-protective cognition is
the style of reasoning for rationally engaging information that is
relevant to identity-expressive beliefs, particularly when that
information has no other real relevance to an individual’s life.
Of course, when everyone uses their reason this way at once,
collective welfare suffers. In that case, culturally diverse demo-
cratic citizens won’t converge, or converge as quickly, on the sig-
niﬁcance of valid evidence on how to manage societal risks. But
that doesn’t change the social incentives that make it rational for
any individual – and hence every individual – to engage informa-
tion in this way. Only some collective intervention – one that
effectively dispels the conﬂict between the individual’s interest
in forming identity-expressive risk perceptions and society’s
interest in the formation of accurate ones – could (Kahan et al.
2012b; Lessig 1995).
Rationality≠accuracy (necessarily). Like the scholarship
Jussim criticizes, the standard view of identity-protective cogni-
tion force ﬁts a species of human perception into the bounded-
rationality template. But unlike the larger intellectual project
that Jussim attacks, the mistake that doing so involves here does
not reﬂect the ﬁeld’s commitment to denigrating perceptual
“accuracy.”
Obviously, it isn’t possible to assess the “rationality” of any
pattern of information processing unless one gets what the
agent processing the information is trying to accomplish.
Because forming accurate “factual perceptions” is not the only
thing people use information for, a paradigm that motivates
empirical researchers to appraise cognition exclusively in relation
to that objective will indeed end up painting a distorted picture of
human thinking.
But worse, the picture will simply be wrong. The body of
science this paradigm generates will fail, in particular, to supply
us with the information a pluralistic democratic society needs to
manage the forces that pit citizens’ stake in using their reason to
know what’s known and using it to be who they are as members
of diverse cultural groups against one another (Kahan 2015b).
The dominance of the bounded-rationality paradigm creates
this risk. But a counterprogram that seeks to vindicate human
rationality by relentlessly defending the “accuracy” of “percep-
tions” without addressing how individuals use reason to protect
their group identities won’t remedy the former’s defects.
Realism and constructivism in social
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Abstract: Jussim’s critique of social psychology’s embrace of error and bias
is needed and often persuasive. In opting for perceptual realism over social
constructivism, however, he seems to ignore a third choice – a cognitive
constructivism which has a long and distinguished history in the study of
nonsocial perception, and which enables us to understand both accuracy
and error.
Figure 2 (Kahan). “System 2” identity-protective cognition. Subjects’ assessment of the evidence of the validity of the Cognitive
Reﬂection Test (CRT) as an “open-mindedness” test was conditional on congruence of experimentally manipulated information on
who scored higher – “climate-change skeptics” or “believers” – and subjects’ political identities. This effect was most pronounced
among subjects scoring higher on the CRT itself. Derived from multivariate regression. Predictors for “low” and “high” CRT set at 0
and 2, respectively. CIs reﬂect 0.95 level of conﬁdence (N=1750). From Kahan (2013).
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The purpose of perception is action (to paraphrase Bruner
1957b), and so it is important that our percepts be reasonably
accurate. And evidently they are, or else we would not have sur-
vived so long as a species and as individuals (or maybe the Uni-
verse is just very forgiving). Nevertheless, over the last few
decades many social psychologists have come to embrace the
view that social perception is riddled with error and bias – a frame-
work that I have dubbed the “People Are Stupid School of Psy-
chology” (Kihlstrom 2004b; see also Kihlstrom 2004a; 2004c;
2008). The tenets of “stupidism” may be summarized as follows:
1. People are fundamentally irrational: In the ordinary course
of everyday living, we do not think very hard about anything, pre-
ferring heuristic shortcuts that lead us astray; and we let our feel-
ings and desires get in the way of our thought processes.
2. We are on automatic pilot: We do not pay much attention to
what is going on around us, and to what we are doing; as a result,
our thoughts and actions are inordinately swayed by ﬁrst impres-
sions and immediate responses; free will is an illusion.
3. We don’t know what we are doing: When all is said and
done, our behavior is mostly unconscious; the reasons we give
are little more than post-hoc rationalizations, and our forecasts
are invalid; to make things worse, consciousness actually gets in
the way of adaptive behavior.
4. We don’t know what we want:We are extremely poor at pre-
dicting how we will feel about various eventualities, and we are so
poor at making choices that we might just as well let others choose
for us – largely because, again, we don’t have accurate introspec-
tive access to our beliefs, feelings, and desires. One is reminded
of the joke about the two behaviorists who had sex: one said to
the other: “It was good for you, but was it good for me?”
5. We don’t even know how stupid we are: Because of the lim-
itations on our cognitive abilities, we fail to appreciate when our
judgments and behaviors are less than optimal.
Stupidism – to the extent that it is not just a ﬁgment of my imag-
ination –was in some respects an unanticipated consequence of a
very reasonable program of research which employed evidence of
errors to produce a more realistic description of how people actu-
ally make judgments and decisions. But there are even deeper
roots of social psychology’s preference for the thoughtless, uncon-
scious, automatic, biased, and error-prone. Somehow, fairly early
on, social psychology got deﬁned as the study of the effect of the
social situation on the individual’s experience, thought, and action
(G. W. Allport 1954a; see also Kihlstrom 2013). And, perhaps in a
quest for institutional approval, it got tied to the functional behav-
iorism of Watson and Skinner (Zimbardo 1999). Think, for
example, of the classic work on the “Four A’s” of social psychol-
ogy: attitudes, attraction, aggression, and altruism; think, too, of
the history of research on conformity and compliance, from
Asch and before, to Milgram and beyond. In each case, the exper-
imenter manipulates some aspect of the environment, and
observes its effect on subjects’ behavior. Sometimes there were
inferences about intervening mental states, but not very often –
otherwise, the cognitive revolution in social psychology wouldn’t
have been a revolution.
Occasionally there have been attempts at correction (e.g.,
Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Hastie & Dawes 2001; Krueger &
Funder 2004; Malle 2006). For example, the self-other difference
in causal attribution appears not to occur, at least in the form that
is usually claimed for it; and, by extension, the “Fundamental
Attribution Error” turns out to be problematic, too (someone,
not me, once quipped that the Fundamental Attribution Error
isn’t an error, but it is fundamental). Still, errors and biases are
so much a part of the current social-psychological Zeitgeist that
these critiques have not, seemingly, had much impact on how psy-
chologists think about social interaction. Now comes Jussim
(2012; and present BBS target article) with the heavy artillery, sys-
tematically dismantling most of the canonical claims for the power
of error and bias. And pretty convincingly, too.
But it is one thing to argue for the fundamental accuracy of
social perception, and quite another thing to argue for a particular
view of perceptual realism, and against a particular view of con-
structivism. Social constructivism shouldn’t be abandoned
entirely – not least because, despite the exaggerations of so
much constructivist theory (Hacking 1999), so much of the
social world is a social construction (Searle 1995; 2011). But
Jussim seems to opt for some version of perceptual realism,
which is not the only alternative.
Historically, the study of perception has been framed by two
competing paradigms (Epstein 1979; Epstein & Park 1964; for a
complete review, see Palmer 1999).The most inﬂuential
approach, beginning in the 19th century with Helmholtz and con-
tinuing in the 20th with Hochberg, Gregory, and Rock, is, indeed,
constructivist in nature. Helmholtz and the others argued that
stimulus information is vague, fragmentary, and ambiguous, and
that the perceiver must, in Bruner’s (1957a) phrase, “go beyond
the information given” by the stimulus by drawing on knowledge,
memory, expectations, and inferences (even unconscious infer-
ences) to form a mental representation of that is the most likely
interpretation of stimulus information – an interpretation that
may be inaccurate in important respects. Perceptual constructiv-
ism has been challenged by Gibson’s theory of direct perception,
or ecological optics, which holds that all the information needed
for perception is provided by the stimulus environment, and
that our perceptual apparatus evolved to pick up just that informa-
tion which allows us to perceive the world the way it really is.
Some former constructivists were persuaded by this point of
view (Neisser 1976a; 1976b), and some advocates have gone so
far as to argue that there are no “top-down” cognitive inﬂuences
on perception at all (Firestone & Scholl 2016).
Jussim, by emphasizing realistic accuracy over constructivist
error and bias, seems to incline toward the Gibsonian view. A Gib-
sonian approach has also been embraced by some other social psy-
chologists, (e.g., McArthur & Baron 1983), and indeed there is a
great deal about social perception that can be studied from the
ecological point of view. There is a lot of information in the stim-
ulus ﬁeld, and its background context, and it seems particularly
appropriate when analyzing facial emotion, lie detection, and
other aspects of person perception which may be largely based
on physical appearance and gesture. At the same time, there is
a lot of evidence favoring the (Helmholtzian) constructivist
view, and some of it even comes from errors on these very
tasks. It seems that person perception is prone to inaccuracy,
after all.
For example, people do not seem to be particularly accurate at
detecting deception, largely because their naive theories of decep-
tion lead them to pick up on the wrong cues (e.g., Bond &
DePaulo 2006; 2008; Hartwig & Bond 2011; 2014). Our
“gaydar” does not appear to be that good, either, once we take
account of base-rates (e.g., Bruno et al. 2014; Lyons et al. 2014;
Poderl 2014) – a problem that bedevils the detection of deception
as well. Even our accuracy at reading emotion from facial expres-
sions –which seems the likeliest candidate, in the social domain,
for an evolved, hard-wired, perceptual module of the Gibsonian
sort – seems to be inﬂated by such method factors as the use of
a forced-choice response format (e.g., Hassin et al. 2013;
Nelson & Russell 2013).
Although Jussim is right to be skeptical of a radical social con-
structivist approach which denies the existence of an independent
reality, it would seem that the nature of social reality invites a per-
ceptual-constructivist approach. Bruner and Tagiuri (1954), in an
early analysis of person perception, listed a number of factors that
inﬂuence perceptual organization, including the stimulus array
itself (a prescient nod toward Gibson), but also selective attention,
linguistic categories, and especially the internal state of the per-
ceiver – his mental set, or expectations, and his own emotional
and motivational state. Much as the stimulus array for nonsocial
perception consists of the energy (light waves, sound waves,
etc.) that radiates from the distal stimulus, falls on the sensory sur-
faces, and is transduced by receptor organs into neural impulses,
the stimulus array for person perception also consists of the
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person’s appearance and behavior, as well as the language that
others use to describe the person. Much more so than the nonso-
cial case, the interpersonal stimulus is almost inherently vague,
fragmentary, and ambiguous, affording a great deal of room for
divergent interpretations. Often, the environment provides con-
ﬂicting cues as to the nature and activity of the stimulus person,
increasing the difﬁculty of forming an accurate perceptual repre-
sentation of reality. Moreover, the social situation provides plenty
of leeway for emotion and motivation to bias perceptual-cognitive
processes (Abelson1963; Bruner 1992; Bruner & Goodman 1947;
Bruner & Klein 1960). While all theories of perception, including
Gibson’s, assume that the context makes a great deal of difference
to perception, context effects are arguably even more salient in
the social world, so that the same person, or behavior, may be per-
ceived differently, depending on the situation –which is itself
inherently vague, fragmentary, and ambiguous. For all these
reasons, the social perceiver must ﬁll in the gaps, and resolve
the ambiguities, by making inferences about the stimulus given
his knowledge, expectations, and beliefs. This is the expressly cog-
nitive contribution of the perceiver to perception; and in this con-
structive activity lies the possibility for error and bias to occur.
Brunswik’s (1955a; 1955b) lens model offers one framework for
conceptualizing these constructive processes. The stimulus may
provide ecologically valid cues as to its nature, but the perceiver
has to utilize those cues in order to form an accurate mental rep-
resentation of the stimulus; if the perceiver utilizes the wrong
cues, or weights valid cues incorrectly, the representation will
be inaccurate or biased. Neisser’s (1976a) idea of the perceptual
cycle offers a similar framework. The stimulus provides informa-
tion to the perceiver, but the perceiver’s exploration of the stim-
ulus is guided by internal cognitive schemata; eventually, the
cycle of assimilation and accommodation should result in an accu-
rate mental representation of reality – provided, of course, that
the stimulus is richly informative in the ﬁrst place, and the cycle
is allowed to run to completion. Neither is always the case, espe-
cially in the social domain – hence, the intrusion of error and bias.
Jussim is right to offer a corrective to the current emphasis on
error and bias in social perception – though, as my examples indi-
cate, there remain plenty of opportunities for error and bias as
well. This is the price we pay for living in a world in which percep-
tion and cognition occur under conditions of uncertainty. As with
the literature on bounded rationality exempliﬁed by the program
of research on judgment heuristics, anomalies of perception and
cognition can tell us a great deal about how social perception actu-
ally works. More important, though, the choice Jussim offers
between perceptual realism and social constructivism is a false
one, because these are not the only choices available. There is
at least a third way of cognitive constructivism, which allows us
to understand both accuracies and inaccuracies in perception,
where and when they occur.
An evolutionary approach to accuracy in social
perception
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Abstract: An evolutionary approach highlights that accuracy should be
expected over error because selection pressures will have shaped social
perception to be functional. Behaviour is extremely complex and so it is
unlikely that observers will be perfectly accurate, but an evolutionary
view strongly predicts that people will behave as rational observers and
in many cases social perception should favour adaptive responses.
Jussim’s main thesis is that much research in social psychology has
overemphasised error while ignoring accuracy in social perception
(Jussim 2012). Jussim’s eloquent argument is squarely aimed at
social psychologists, and he clearly articulates methodological
and interpretation issues with often cited studies in favour of
error and self-fulﬁlling prophecies. He also highlights general
research issues that are relevant across science, such as careful
research design, the importance of replications (or lack thereof),
and the need to focus on effect sizes rather than statistical signiﬁ-
cance. Indeed, it is the small effect sizes found across studies and
meta-analyses (Chapters 6–9) that should make it difﬁcult for any
reasonable scientist to persist with the notion that error dominates
accuracy and that self-fulﬁlling prophecies have, on average, pow-
erful effects on other’s behaviour. Likewise, the accuracy found
across studies (Chs. 17 and 18) makes it clear that accuracy is
real and worth studying.
What Jussim is arguing against largely stems from deep rooted
ideology in social psychology (as he discusses in Chs. 2 and 10). In
other areas of science, however, the argument that social percep-
tion should be accurate would not be considered controversial
and, in fact, may be taken as an assumption. Speciﬁcally, evolu-
tionary or biological approaches examine behaviour in many dif-
ferent species addressing how these behaviours are adaptive and
functional. Of course, while it is naive to assume that all behaviour
is adaptive, it would be surprising to expect error to dominate
accuracy from this view point.
For any organism, the fundamental problems are survival and
reproduction, and these often encompass navigating a social
world in which individuals, for example, compete, cooperate,
and ﬁnd a mate in a pool of other individuals. Consequently,
non-human animals demonstrate a variety of adaptations to
assess the behaviour of others and there is a large literature con-
cerning the evolution of animal signals used to communicate,
among other things, behaviour (Krebs & Dawkins 1984). For
example, in antagonistic encounters with other individuals of the
same species, the primary decision to be made is to ﬁght or not.
Given the potential costs, injury or even death, we might expect
that animals will possess perceptual/cognitive adaptations to
assess the risks by assessing ﬁghting ability in their opponents
(Enquist & Leimar 1983; Parker 1974). Indeed, there is evidence
that animals such as mice and crabs make adaptive decisions about
ﬁghting based on the assessment of the relative ﬁghting abilities of
their opponents (L. M. Gosling et al. 1996; Hazlett 1996). Accu-
racy could arise because speciﬁc traits of some species can be
related to ﬁghting success. For example, variable black facial pat-
terns in paper wasps are related to body size and social dominance
(Tibbetts & Dale 2004), and in gelada baboons high status males
have the reddest chests (Bergman et al. 2009). Individuals could
base their decisions to ﬁght on appearance linked cues to ﬁghting
ability allowing them to compete when likely to win and to avoid
costly agonistic interactions when likely to lose.
An evolutionary view then has a prediction concerning accuracy
and inaccuracy in social perception because this view tends to
assume that perception serves an adaptive function: The external
world is full of information that can be used to guide adaptive and
functional behaviours (Zebrowitz-McArthur & Baron 1983). If, in
our evolutionary past, information were presented about a
person’s behaviour (e.g., likelihood of cooperation or aggression)
in any way, then an advantage would accrue to those who utilised
these cues and those individuals would leave more genes behind
in the next generation. An individual may not last long if they
make too many errors in important social domains and that indi-
vidual may not leave many offspring compared to an individual
who is able to more accurately predict the behaviour of others.
Of course, this does not mean stimulus-perception links should
be innate, selection pressures could favour accuracy or adaptive
behaviour via learning or calibration mechanisms.
Other researchers have emphasised that social perception is
functional rather than error prone. The evolutionary view has
much in common with an ecological approach (Gibson 1979),
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